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Abstract
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11. Introduction
Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) showed that two candidates competing in an
election will both choose the position of the median voter as their platform. This
resultwascoined theprincipalofminimumdifferentiation(or MD) byBoulder (1966)
. Later work, however, showed that this result is highly sensitive to the assumptions
made. In particular, with more than two candidates, the possibility of entry, or a
changeintheunderlyingdistributionofvoters’preferences,theprincipleofminimum
differentiation no longer holds. In this letter, we show that MD is restored under
a runoff system, where only the two most successful candidates in the ¿rst round
are allowed to run in the second. Our result is robust to changes in the number of
candidates, to the possibility of entry, and the distribution of voters’ preferences.
In a seminal paper, Hotelling (1929) showed that two ¿rms, in choosing a location on
a straight line, will locate exactly in the middle. Both Hotelling (1929) and Downs
(1957) suggested that this model can also be used to study political competition.
When two candidates participating in an election locate in an ideological space, the
model then implies that both will choose a position that is equal to that of the median
voter. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) relax several of the assumptions Hotelling makes.
They show that MD no longer holds when more than 2 candidates are competing.
Notably, with 3 candidates, a Nash equilibrium fails to exist. These results were also
p r o v e nb yS e l t e n( 1 9 7 1 ) .A l s o ,f o rn 2 the equilibrium depends on the probability
distribution of voters’ position on the line. Prescott and Visscher (1977) show that
the possibility of entry will also induce candidates not to locate in the middle. In the
context of ¿rms, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) note that when ¿rms
also set prices, they will locate at the extremes when transportation costs are linear.
Quadratic transportation costs restore MD.1
All these results, when interpreted in a political context, assume that candidates
choose a location so as to maximize the share of the vote. Real-world elections,
however, often do not work this way. In numerous countries, such as in France,
Portugal, and Austria, the winner of, for example, a presidential election is decided
in two rounds (see e.g. Lijphart 1994). In the ¿rst round, many candidates run. In the
second round, or runoff, only the two most successful candidates from the ¿rst round
are allowed to compete.2 Voters choose between these two to decide who ultimately
1 For a survey of more contributions to this literature, see e.g. Martin (1993), chapter 10 for the
economic, and Shepsle (1991) for the political interpretation of the model.
2 Osborne and Slivinski (1996) also study a runoff system. But they assume citizen-candidates, i.e.
each candidate uses his own preference as a platform in the election, rather than choosing a platform
2wins the election. This system is also used in all presidential elections in Latin
America (see Cox 1997). Other countries, such as Australia, use an Alternative Vote
system to elect the house of representatives. In this system, voters already announce
in the ¿rst round who they will vote for should their favorite candidate be eliminated
in the ¿rst round. For more on this system, see, for example, Bogdanor (1983). It can
easily be seen that the results we derive in this paper also hold for an Alternative Vote
system.
In this paper, we show that MD is restored when elections are held under a runoff
system. We show that, regardless of the number of initial candidates, all of them
will choose the position of the median voter. Moreover, this result carries through in
circumstances when the distribution of voters’ preferences are not uniform. Finally,
we show that our result also holds when potential entry is taken into account. Section
2 considers the standard case, with n candidates and a uniform distribution of voters’
preferences. In section 3 we show that entry does not change our results. Section 4
generalizes to any distribution of voters’ preferences.
2. Why a Runoff System Restores MD
Considerthefollowingset-up.Wehaveanelectionwithtworounds. Inthe¿rstround,
n candidates participate. The 2 candidates with the highest share of the vote proceed
to the second round. The candidate with the largest share of the vote in that round
wins the election.
Preferences are represented by a horizontal line, normalized to [01] Before the
¿rst round, every candidate i chooses his position Pi We assume that this position
cannot be changed between rounds, for example since such a shift in position would
undermine the candidate’s credibility, destroying his chances to win the election.
Voters are uniformly distributed on [01] an assumption we will relax in section
4. Voters always vote for the candidate with the position that is closest to theirs. In
case of a tie, they decide randomly which candidate to vote for. We can now establish
the following result.
Theorem 2.1 Whenvoters’preferencesareuniformlydistributed,theuniquesymmetric
Nash equilibrium has all candidates choosing the position of the median voter: Pi 
1
2 1i
that maximizes the chance of winning the election.
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n set Pi  1
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With n  3 this condition is satis¿ed for P)
n   1
6 Any defection with P)
n  1
6 then
implies that candidate n already drops out in the ¿rst round. With n  4 it is satis¿ed
for P)
n   0 For larger n it always holds. However, when candidate n follows such
a defection, he will face a run-off with some candidate j who has Pj  1
2 He will
always lose this run-off: his share of the vote will equal S2
n  1
2 P)
n  1
4 whereas that
of his competitor equals S2
i  3
4  1
2P)
n which, with P)
n  1
2 is always higher. Thus,
defecting from an equilibrium with Pi  1
21i is never pro¿table. The uniqueness of
the symmetric Nash equilibrium is trivial. Suppose there is a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium with Pi / 1
2 and equal for all i Then any candidate j can improve by
defecting to Pj  1
2 By doing so, he wins both the ¿rst and second round. 
The above proof also provides an intuition for this result. By choosing a position
different from that of the median voter, a candidate may win the ¿rst round. In the
second round, however, he will be beaten by one of the candidates that did choose
the median voter’s position.3
3 Admittedly, the equilibrium described in the theorem is not the unique Nash equilibrium. For
example, with n  4 the same argument as in the proof can be used to show that P1  P2  1
2  
and P3  P4  1
2   is also an equilibrium, for small enough  Yet, such an equilibrium does not
exist for all n With n odd, it can be shown that no other Nash equilibrium exists. Also, we believe that
the equilibrium in the text is the most natural one. In any non-symmetric equilibrium some coordination
mechanism is needed to determine which candidate chooses which position. Such problems do not exist
in our equilibrium. Therefore, we believe our equilibrium is focal in the sense of Schelling (1960).
43. The Case of Potential Entry
Prescottand Visscher (1977) argue that MDnolongerholdswhencandidatesconsider
the possibility of entry of third candidates. When two incumbents do choose the
median position, they argue, such an entrant can secure almost half of the vote by
entering just to the left or just to the right of the median voter, leaving the original
incumbents with only 1
4 of the vote. When incumbents anticipate this possibility, they
will not locate at the median voter but, rather, at positions 1
4 and 3
4.
In our model, however, this argument does not hold. Suppose that n candidates are
located at 1
2, and a new candidate enters. The best the new candidate can do is locate
at 1
2 as well, by the same argument as in the proof of theorem 1. Entering at any other
location will result in losing the election in the second round. Hence, the incumbents
do not have an incentive to locate differently. We thus have
Theorem 3.1 With potential entry, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium has all
candidates choosing the position of the median voter.
4. The Case of a General Distribution Function
So far, we have restricted attention to the case in which the preferences of the voters
are uniformly distributed. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) show that, with n   2 the
equilibrium depends on the distribution of voters. In this section, we show that, in
our set-up, this distribution does not affect the results.
Theorem 4.1 For any continuous distribution of voters’ preferences, the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium has all candidates choosing the position of the median
voter: Pi  pm 1i
PROOF. The proof is virtually identical to that of theorem 1. Suppose voters’
preferences are described by a probability density function Fp, with F0  0a n d
F 1 1 The median voter pm is the one for whom Fpm  1
2 Restrict attention
to the case n   2 the case n  2 being the standard one-round case already proven
by Eaton and Lipsey (1975). Assume that all candidates i  1nset Pi  pm
Now suppose that candidate n considers a defection to some P)
n / pm. Without loss
of generality, suppose P)
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n This is intuitive it implies
that the share of the vote of candidate n is higher than the average share of the vote
of all n voters. Suppose n chooses a defection such that this condition is met. Then,
in the second round, he will face a run-off with some candidate j with Pj  pm He
will always lose this run-off. 
5. Conclusion
A wealth of literature suggests that the principal of minimum differentiation does not
hold with more than two candidates, when the distribution of voters’ preferences is
not uniform and/or there is potential entry. In this paper we showed that, in all these
circumstances, every candidate does choose the position of the median voter when
the election is held under a runoff system.
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